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 1. Introduction  
 
As the world looked on the tragic images of two planes crashing on 11 September 2001 
into the towers of the World Trade Center, a Pandora's box was opened of potential 
threats to the security of states.1 It was not merely observed as a human disaster of 
unprecedented scale, but also as an event that would change the world forever. In the 
immediate aftermath of the terror attacks, a discourse of danger and fear emerged that 
served as a legitimizing factor for policy-making and military action.2 Despite the prolific 
studies on the securitization of migration and asylum policies, and attempts to explore 
the consequences of 9/11 for the framing of debates on immigration, there remains 
surprisingly little agreement among scholars as to the question of the securitization of 
migration policies at the European Union (EU) level following the terrorist attacks.3  
 
Since the early 1980s, population movements have increasingly been framed in terms of 
security threat, leading to the introduction of restrictive migration policies at both the 
national and the EU level. The construction of ‘the migrant’ as alien to Western societies, 
yet able to access its territory and challenge the economic, cultural and societal stability 
of the system, gave rise to concerns about uncontrolled entry.4 It is now conventional 
wisdom that 9/11 provided an opportunity to intensify this connection between 
migration and security through explicitly linking migrants to the transnational threat of 
terrorism. According to adherents of this thinking, the events have had far-reaching 
consequences for debates on migration policies in Europe.5 The framing of terrorism as 
a new existential danger gave rise to the idea that this was an exceptional event that 
                                                        
1 Nicholas Blake, "Exclusion from Refugee Protection: Serious Non Political Crimes after 9/11," European 
Journal of Migration and Law 4, no. 4 (2002): 425, DOI: 10.1163/157181602763715019.  
2 Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity : Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (London: Routledge, 2006), 
5.  
3 Stéphane J. Baele and Olivier C. Sterck, "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A 
New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims," Political Studies 63, no. 5 (2015): 1120, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9248.12147.  
4 Georgios Karyotis, "European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11,” Innovation: The 
European Journal of Social Science Research 20, no. 1 (2007): 1, DOI: 10.1080/13511610701197783. 
5 Gwendolyn Sasse, "Securitization or Securing Rights? Exploring the Conceptual Foundations of Policies 
towards Minorities and Migrants in Europe*," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 43, no. 4 (2005): 
673-93, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2005.00591.x.   
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could only be dealt with by exceptional solutions.6 Contradictory but equally vigorous 
claims have been made on the absence of an intensification of the security rationale 
driving EU policy-making. Although these authors acknowledge that certain patterns of 
framing migration as a security problem were already present before 9/11, they insist 
that alternative discourses are equally important.7 In an attempt to shrink this gap in the 
literature, by providing a comprehensive analysis of EU migration policy, this thesis will 
ask: What was the impact of 9/11 on the securitization of migration policies at the 
European Union (EU) Level? 
 
The general hypothesis underlining the analysis builds on the idea that the main 
question should not be analyzed with the intention of formulating a simple yes or no 
answer. The reason is that both the processes of securitization, as well as the field of EU 
migration policy are too complex and multifaceted to be explained in such simplistic 
wording. 8  Previous efforts to analyze the impact of 9/11 have oversimplified 
securitization processes due to a general lack of understanding of robust methods for 
designing research projects, including ways to collect data and means for analysis.9 
Additionally, very few scholars have taken account of the complex nature of EU 
migration policy, which consist of four subfields. It is time to finally dismantle the idea 
that securitization is a polar question whose expected answer is either affirmative or 
negative. Instead, securitization should be judged according to its intensity and 
instances of securitized practices should be placed in the wider spectrum of the 
discourse.10  Such a balanced approach guides the analysis of this thesis which 
formulates an argument by carefully examining every aspect of the policy. In doing so, 
every migration policy document produced in the period 1999-2004 is divided over four 
categories: asylum, legal migration, irregular migration, and external borders and visa. 
                                                        
6 Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," 
Alternatives 27, no. 1 (2002): 63-92, 
http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/doi/pdf/10.1177/03043754020270S105.  
7 Christina Boswell, "Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the Absence of 
Securitization*," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 3 (2007): 589-596, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
5965.2007.00722.x. 
8 Stéphane J. Baele and Olivier C. Sterck, "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A 
New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims," Political Studies 63, no. 5 (2015): 1123-1125, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9248.12147. 
9 Thierry Balzacq, Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London: Routledge, 
2011), 31. 
10 Stéphane J. Baele and Olivier C. Sterck, "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A 
New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims," Political Studies 63, no. 5 (2015): 1124-1126, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9248.12147. 
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Furthermore, securitization is accepted as a process that gradually gained momentum 
during the 1980s when globalization and the opening of markets caused an increase in 
the number of migrants arriving in Europe.11 The question thus becomes whether 9/11 
caused any significant changes to this trend and if we can discern an intensification of 
the security discourse.  
 
This thesis argues against conventional knowledge by stating that empirical research on 
securitization has not produced consistent and conclusive evidence to provide an 
definitive answer as to the securitization question. The analysis indicates that, unlike 
previous studies had suggested, the various subfields are each driven by distinct 
discursive mechanisms. With regard to asylum, the research identifies the presence of a 
humanitarian discourse underlining the EU’s long tradition of protection, human rights, 
democracy and freedom. The same can be said regarding the field of legal migration, in 
which attempts to keep security issues to the minimum are even more visible. This 
stands in stark contrast with the two other subfields. Irregular migration, in particular, 
witnessed quite an increase in securitized moves following 9/11. This already becomes 
evident by the immense increase in legislation during the period that was studied. Next 
to securitized moves, the analysis signals various instances where the EU tried to 
‘externalize’ migration policy in order to prevent migrants from ever reaching the 
European border. Furthermore, whereas before 9/11 irregular migration was mostly 
linked to problems related to crime, a stronger correlation with terrorism emerged after 
the attacks. Finally, a similar conclusion will be drawn in relation to the subfield of 
external borders and visa policy. The evidence suggests that there was a substantial 
increase in the adaptation of new technologies to control borders and exchange 
information on migrants following 9/11. These technological measures were aimed at 
the deterrence and prevention of immigrants from entering the EU, and contributed to 
the strengthening of fortress Europe. 
 
The argument will proceed through three sections, starting with a review of the 
literature on the consequences of 9/11 for the securitization of migration policies at the 
EU level. The discussion elaborates on the various arguments presented by the two 
                                                        
11 Ayse Ceyhan and Anastassia Tsoukala, “The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: 
Ambivalent Discourses and Policies,” Alternatives 27, no. 1 (2002): 21, 
http://alt.sagepub.com/content/27/1_suppl/21.full.pdf+html.  
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opposing literary camps and provides an explanation for this contestation. The 
discussion illuminates two major weaknesses of securitization studies - one 
methodological and another theoretical. Consequently, the next section provides an 
explanation on how these pitfalls are avoided in this research and details the 
methodology used to select policy documents and clarifies how they have been analyzed. 
Section four consists out of four parts each dealing with a specific subfield. It indicates 
the various discourses driving integration and shows the complexity of providing a 
clear-cut answer to the question of the effect of 9/11 on the securitization of EU 
migration policy. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
The literature on securitization theory presents an immense record of scholars solely 
interested in the impact of 9/11 on EU migration policy. Efforts to formulate a 
fundamental answer to the question of the consequences for securitization processes 
have generated contradictory claims.12 The works of Jef Huysmans and Didier Bigo, in 
particular, offer key insights and have been pivotal in developing subsequent arguments 
on both sides of the debate. According to Huysmans, the start of European integration in 
the field of migration during the early 1980s was heavily shaped by the changing 
realities of the international system and the ensuing concerns about the movements of 
populations.13 In policy debates, migration was often linked to criminal activities such as 
the smuggling and trafficking of persons and to abuse of the social, cultural, and 
economic provisions related to the welfare state. 14  According to Huysmans, 
securitization is defined as the political and institutional framing of migration in a 
“domain of insecurity”. Defining certain events as threats or dangers contributes to the 
legitimacy of a political language that emphasizes crisis and exceptionality.15 Bigo agrees 
that securitization results from the construction of migration as a security issue. In 
addition, he focused on bureaucratic procedures and administrative practices to 
broaden the conceptualization of securitization. Securitization also emerges through 
security technologies that widened the scope of observation, including improved 
techniques of surveillance and opportunities to gather or cross-check information.16 
These improvements in technologies of identification and profiling of population groups 
                                                        
12 Stéphane J. Baele and Olivier C. Sterck, "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A 
New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims," Political Studies 63, no. 5 (2015): 1120-1121, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9248.12147. 
13 Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (London: Routledge, 2006), 
1-3.  
14 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common Market 
Studies 38, no. 5 (December 2000): 756-758, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-
5965.00263/epdf. 
15 Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (London: Routledge, 2006), 
5.  
16 Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease," 
Alternatives 27, no. 1 (2002): 63-92, 
http://journals.sagepub.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv.nl:2048/doi/pdf/10.1177/03043754020270S105.  
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allowed governments to control entry and exclusion of third country nationals who 
were referred to as ‘dangerous’ or ‘unwanted’.17 
 
Both authors illuminate the complexity of securitization processes in political discourse 
and political practice. These insights have been endorsed several times in the literary 
debate on the effects of 9/11. On the one hand, there is the popular view that the terror 
attacks introduced a new security agenda which had a profound effect on the way the EU 
shaped its migration policy. Huysmans, in his earlier work, holds onto this view by 
stating that the politics of exception surrounding 9/11 justified the introduction of 
security measures and legislation that was usually reserved for emergencies.18 
According to Baldaccini, the events of 9/11 forged the idea that improving border 
security was crucial to protect the EU’s internal security and reduce its vulnerability to 
terrorism. Echoing Bigo, to improve border security, the EU relied on “the ever-greater 
sophistication of security technology, in particular the use of biometric features in 
passports, visas, residence permits and identity documents, and the development and 
expansion of EU-wide information systems.”19 Brouwer also points to the acceleration of 
EU decision-making on these themes to construct her argument. Similar to Huysmans, 
she notes that developments at the EU level indicate that the event was used to 
consolidate legislation that previously lacked the necessary support but now found 
acceptance in the EU’s common goal of combating terrorism. Furthermore, she finds that 
in the first half year after 9/11, no new asylum law was adopted, which was a direct 
result of the attacks.20 As Member States put new emphasis on safeguarding internal 
security, the EU moved away from earlier Council conclusions that called for a 
harmonized approach. Instead, the national agendas of Member States focused on 
biometric data and the development of databases for migration purposes started to 
                                                        
17 Didier Bigo, “Frontier controls in the European Union: who is in control?,” in Controlling Frontiers: Free 
Movement into and Within Europe, ed. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 73-78. 
18 Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (London: Routledge, 2006), 
5.  
19Anneliese Baldaccini, "Counter-Terrorism and the EU Strategy for Border Security: Framing Suspects 
with Biometric Documents and Databases," European Journal of Migration and Law 10, no. 1 (2008): 31-33, 
DOI: 10.1163/138836407X261308.  
20 Evelien Brouwer, "Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic Legal and Practical 
Developments in the EU in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09," European Journal of Migration and 
Law 4, no. 4 (2002): 422, DOI: 10.1163/157181602763715000. 
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determine EU decision-making.21 This connection between 9/11 and the progress of EU 
integration is also studied by Levy, who stated that the trend towards a more liberal 
democratic asylum regime seemed to be “stopped dead in its tracks”.22 Besides, both 
authors focus on the negative repercussions for the relationship between securing 
refugee protection on the one hand, and guaranteeing control over terrorists who might 
try to enter the EU on the other.23 Despite that all these authors acknowledge that even 
before 9/11 the process of EU integration in the field migration was more focused on 
security than on liberalization, they find that 9/11 gave rise to a new security agenda 
that generated an imbalance between protecting the internal security of the EU and the 
need to safeguard the free movement of people.24 The predominance of the security 
rationale was reinforced by the attacks and justified a range of policies to control 
migration that would otherwise not be considered legitimate.25 
 
These views are challenged by certain scholars who claim that 9/11 did not lead to the 
introduction of a new security agenda per se. Instead, pointing to the observation that a 
general pattern of linking immigration to crime and terrorism had already been 
prominent from the 1980s onwards, Bigo argues that more than ten years of the same 
“story telling” and security framing had created a discourse that no longer needed to be 
explained. In other words, securitization in the field of migration had become self-
evident. Therefore, 9/11 had by no means introduced a new agenda because policies 
after the events adhered to the exact same trends of the previous years.26 In line with 
this reasoning, Boswell also finds that the public debate remained relatively unaffected 
by the anti-terrorism agenda, with the exception of some attempts to securitize 
migration in the direct aftermath of the attacks. She insists that this linkage was difficult 
to sustain since alternative framings were equally influential and due to the fact that 
                                                        
21 Evelien Brouwer, "Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic Legal and Practical 
Developments in the EU in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09," European Journal of Migration and 
Law 4, no. 4 (2002): 423, DOI: 10.1163/157181602763715000. 
22 Carl Levy, "The European Union after 9/11: The Demise of a Liberal Democratic Asylum Regime?," 
Government and Opposition 40, no. 1 (2005): 35, DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-7053.2005.00142.x. 
23 Evelien Brouwer, "Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic Legal and Practical 
Developments in the EU in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09," European Journal of Migration and 
Law 4, no. 4 (2002): 424, DOI: 10.1163/157181602763715000. 
24 Monica den Boer and Jorg Monar, "Keynote Article: 11 September and the Challenge of Global Terrorism 
to the EU as a Security Actor," Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2002): 11-28. 
25Georgios Karyotis, "European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11,” Innovation: The 
European Journal of Social Science Research 20, no. 1 (2007): 6-8, DOI: 10.1080/13511610701197783.  
26 Didier Bigo, “Frontier controls in the European Union: who is in control?,” in Controlling Frontiers: Free 
Movement into and Within Europe, ed. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 63. 
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securitizing EU migration policies had negative effects on other organizational 
interests.27 In addition, Boswell problematizes the causal link between discourses and 
policy practices. She argues that the simultaneous occurrence of securitization through 
public discourse, and the appropriation of policy instruments for the purposes of 
counterterrorism, does not necessarily indicate a causal link between the two. To put it 
differently, she questions the idea that the introduction of new security technologies 
was a direct result of the securitized discourse.28 Neal follows the same research agenda, 
he asserts that post-9/11 documents, political processes and rationales do not follow 
the classic logic of securitization. Instead, his findings indicate the predominance of an 
alternative logic driving EU decision-making. This modality seeks to undertake a risk 
analysis in order to adopt appropriate measures and tackle identified risks. EU policy-
making and political practices in the field of migration are therefore best understood in 
terms of risk management.29 A similar argument is formulated by van Munster who 
demonstrates how risk management took center stage in the governing of 
immigration.30 Acknowledging this, Huysmans published a new paper on the effects of 
9/11, wherein he argued that no consensus could be reached on the existence of a nexus 
between migration and terrorism.31 
 
The fundamental problem with these studies, regardless of their position in the debate, 
is that they all suffer from two shortcomings - one methodological, one theoretical - that 
account for this lack of consensus. First, the absence of a coherent and objective 
methodological approach guiding research on securitization theory stands out. Balzacq 
brings light to this issue by observing that it seems generally acceptable to formulate an 
answer to the question of securitization without providing an explanation on how and 
why the documents examined are selected. Besides, it seems that there is a lack of 
                                                        
27 Christina Boswell, "Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the Absence of 
Securitization*," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 3 (2007): 589-600, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
5965.2007.00722.x. 
28 Christina Boswell, "Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the Absence of 
Securitization*," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 3 (2007):600-607, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
5965.2007.00722.x. 
29Andrew W. Neal, "Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX*," JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 47, no. 2 (2009): 333-56, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.00807.x. 
30Rens van Munster, Securitizing Immigration: The Politics of Risk in the EU (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009), 142. 
31Jef Huysmans and Alessandra Buonfino,"Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and 
Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK," Political Studies 56, no. 4 (2008): 784, DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00721.x. 
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interest in securitization studies to include clear-cut ways to analyze the selected texts.32 
Evidence is often shaky as it is presented on the basis of very few documents, leading to 
problems such as sampling bias and misrepresentation of certain patterns.33  
 
Next to methodological weaknesses, a two-sided theoretical issue results from a 
misunderstanding concerning the question of securitization. Existing works on 
securitization have oversimplified migration policies at the EU level. Baele and Sterck 
explain this issue by stating that:  
 
“It may be perfectly true, for example, that securitization occurs in the subfield of 
asylum but not in the subfield of highly skilled workers’ immigration. It follows that 
one can only claim that ‘immigration is securitized’ if one shows that all aspects of 
the phenomenon have been securitized – otherwise the claim is an excessive 
generalization.”34 
It means that analyzing EU immigration policy requires the researcher to carefully 
consider the complete policy field by taking account of all the various subfields. The 
second element of the theoretical shortcoming stems from the multifaceted reality of the 
securitization process itself, as this occurs both at the level of political discourse and that 
of political practice. It is very difficult to detect such distinctive patterns and adequately 
make sense of their meaning and the relationship between them.35 Given these 
shortcomings, the next section details a methodology that allows for a balanced 
approach to the main question.  
 
 
                                                        
32 Thierry Balzacq, Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (London: Routledge, 
2011), 31. 
33 Stéphane J. Baele and Olivier C. Sterck, "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A 
New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims," Political Studies 63, no. 5 (2015): 1122-1123, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9248.12147. 
34 Stéphane J. Baele and Olivier C. Sterck, "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A 
New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims," Political Studies 63, no. 5 (2015): 1123, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9248.12147.  
35 Christina Boswell, "Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the Absence of 
Securitization*," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 3 (2007): 5932, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
5965.2007.00722.x. 
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3. Methodology 
 
The literature review concluded that diverging opinions on the impact of 9/11 result 
from two fundamental problems inherent in securitization studies. The methodology 
guiding the analysis in this research overcomes both. First, it acknowledges that 
securitization can only be established if the analysis demonstrates that all aspects of 
migration-related polices at the EU level have been securitized. Hence, every policy 
document made between 1999, the year of the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
the adoption of the Tampere program, and 2004, the year that the Tampere program 
expired, has been gathered and classified according to four samples that constitute the 
complete field of migration policies. The entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam is a 
logical starting point because only at that point it became possible for the EU to adopt 
legislation dealing with all aspects of migration.36 The four samples correspond to the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, and therefore reflect the official 
classifications as implemented through legal acts. The rules governing EU immigration 
and asylum law are found in ‘Title IV’ of Part Three of the EC Treaty in Articles 61-69, 
which define the distinct subfields as:  
• Visas and external borders (Art. 62); 
• Asylum (Art. 63(1) and 63(2); 
• Legal migration (Art. 63(3)(a) and Art. 63(4)); 
• Irregular migration (Art. 63(3)(b)) 
The reason that legislative documents were selected is that these are legally binding 
texts that reflect the EU’s action as it is actually carried out.37 Moreover, most documents 
contain an initial section expressing the context and objective of the legislative act which 
is a good indicator of the priorities, thinking and activities of those parts of the EU 
involved in the implementation of collectively binding decisions.38 Analyzing legal 
                                                        
36Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 3-4. 
37 Stéphane J. Baele and Olivier C. Sterck, "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A 
New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims," Political Studies 63, no. 5 (2015): 1127, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9248.12147.  
38 Christina Boswell, "Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the Absence of 
Securitization*," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 3 (2007):592, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
5965.2007.00722.x. 
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documents therefore also solves the second aspect of the theoretical issue, which 
concerned the complexity of the processes of securitization, since this type of text allows 
researchers to fully understand the two levels at which securitization occurs.39 Given 
this specific research agenda, it is reasonable to place this thesis under umbrella of 
critical security studies, which are driven by an interest in critical discourse analysis. 
This approach moves beyond the emphasis on the discourse of the political elite, in this 
regard the EU institutions, and includes the practices of those parts of the bureaucracy 
responsible for implementing the policy in order to understand how the discourses are 
embedded in wider social practices and political processes.40  Central to critical 
discourse analysis is the idea that the securitization of migration emerges not solely 
from speech acts of politicians, but also from a range of administrative practices which 
are essential for the institutional framing of migration in a domain of insecurity.41 
The methodological weakness of securitization studies results from a lack of 
commitment to transparent document selection. This thesis tries to offset such problems 
by explaining how the documentation consulted was selected. During the initial part of 
the research legislative documents were gathered online.42 Reference works containing 
the text of and commentary upon every significant measure in the field of EU migration 
policy proposed since 1999 proved to be a helpful tool to guide the search.43 The next 
step involved the classification of the documents according to the four subfields by 
looking at the legal basis for action as conferred by the EC Treaty. In the end, the 
database, consisting of four sections, presented an overview of all the legislative acts in 
chronological order. It contained for each individual measure both the preparatory 
                                                        
39Didier Bigo,“When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitizations in Europe,” in International 
Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community, ed. Morten 
Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2000), 162.  
40 Dace Schlentz, “Did 9/11 matter? Securitization of asylum and immigration in the European Union in 
the period from 1992 to 2008,”Working Paper Series no. 56 (2010), Refugee Studies Centre Oxford, 
https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/working-paper-series/wp56-did-911-matter-2010.pdf. 
41 Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity : Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU (London: Routledge, 2006), 
6-13 and 90-95.  
42This was done by searching official websites of EU institutions such as: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/search-in-documents.html, 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/index.cfm;jsessionid=CCECB8DD2A71F439BDDBF7D8F32521
77.cfusion14501?fuseaction=search&language=en&CFID=5324902&CFTOKEN=e643583fe5d37ca7-
C41EC9DD-D01F-9FE7-1A7BBEB0B4EB1024. But also through accessing legal documents published in 
the Official Journal of the European Union: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/oj/direct-access.html; and by 
accessing websites such as: http://www.statewatch.org/; http://aei.pitt.edu/.  
43 See for example  the works of Peers (2006) and Niessen (2004).  
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documents, including the Commission legislative proposals, Council common position, 
initiatives of the European Council and Opinions of the European Parliament, as well as 
the final text of the adopted acts. Next to adopted measures, the database included 
lapsed proposals, withdrawn proposals, and relevant Communications, Discussion 
Papers and Strategy Papers not relating to a specific measure. Finally, I added the 
presidency conclusion of the European Council meetings in Tampere, Laeken, Seville and 
Thessaloniki. Once the database was complete, the analysis started by looking for 
references to the terms terror, terrorism, terrorist, 9/11, September 11, and attacks. The 
documents containing those words were coded as securitized and from this coding 
system the following percentages indicating securitization were calculated.  
Table 1: Quantitative indications of securitization, 1999-2004 
Migration 
sub-field:  
Total 
number of 
documents  
Number of 
documents 
before 
9/11 
Number of 
documents 
after 9/11 
Number of 
‘securitized’ 
documents 
before 9/11 
Number of 
‘securitized’ 
documents 
after 9/11 
Increase 
in % 
Asylum 48 24 24 2 = 8% 6 = 25% 17 % 
Legal 
migration 
36  9 27 1 = 11% 6 = 22 % 11 % 
Illegal 
immigration 
63  21 42 0 = 0% 9 = 21 % 21 % 
External 
borders  
102  25 77 0 = 0% 16 = 21 % 21%  
 
Although in the first instance, the research looked for quantitative changes over time, 
the findings as presented in the table did not indicate a reliable trend. The coding system 
only allowed for the detection of securitization according to a very simple mechanism 
that classified a document as securitized based on a single reference. The mere presence 
of a potentially securitized word provided too little evidence to reach clear-cut 
conclusions. Besides, such a method would also draw into the principles of critical 
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discourse analysis that advocates looking beyond the language of the official policy. 
Consequently, the analysis moved on to finding qualitative data on securitization 
through reading the documents containing references to the terms that were coded as 
securitized. The purpose of the second stage of the analysis was to understand how the 
documents constructed the link between terrorism and migration and what this reveals 
about the way internal security is framed in the political discourse. The documents were 
read for meaning, structure and connection with other themes.44 The preparatory 
documents, in particular, proved to be relevant for constructing the argument as these 
were often longer, comprehensive texts that elaborated on important details such as 
reasons, challenges, objectives and consequences for introducing new legislation. In 
addition, I came to realize that the mere focus on legislative documents and high-profile 
European Council Conclusions would not provide an adequate indication of the 
priorities and thinking of officials involved in the execution of migration policy. In order 
to remain aligned with the research design of critical security studies, it was necessary 
to examine the discussions of the JHA Council, which are summarized in the minutes of 
each meeting of the justice and home affairs ministers in Brussels.45 The JHA Council 
minutes are far-less high-profile than European Council Conclusions, providing a better 
indicator of the interests of the national authorities entrusted with the responsibility to 
implement migration policy. These documents offered important information about 
securitization processes at the level of policy practices as they signaled political 
agreement on issues and set out the direction of policies to be pursued when the 
European Commission issued a proposal.46 At this stage, it became clear that other 
dynamics were also driving EU policy-making, which related back to the literature 
stating that securitization of migration conflicts and interferes with the EU’s 
fundamental values of equality and respect of human rights, with international legal 
obligations in the context of asylum rights, and with the economic and demographic 
                                                        
44 Jef Huysmans and Alessandra Buonfino,"Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and 
Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK," Political Studies 56, no. 4 (2008): 768, DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00721.x. 
45 Christina Boswell, "Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the Absence of 
Securitization*," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 3 (2007): 601, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
5965.2007.00722.x. 
46 “Proceedings of the Justice and Home Affairs Council, 1993 – present,” accessed June 8, 2017, 
http://www.statewatch.org/observatories_files/jha_observatory/#yr2000.  
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needs for labor migrants.47 Additionally, the analysis revealed that although the various 
discourses can be discerned fairly easily in the legislative texts, any causal relationship 
between the different framings and policy outcomes is much harder to establish. 
Consequently, this thesis bolsters the idea that that the relationship between discourses 
and practices is mutually constitutive rather than causally related, which is another key 
concept associated with critical discourse analysis.48 It means that policy practices can 
in principle be legitimized by a wide variety of discourses, whose securitizing intensity 
may be more or less strong, yet securitization is simultaneously constituted, produced 
and reproduced through political practices.49  
During the last part of the research, the focus of the critical discourse analysis shifted 
from the specific securitization processes to more generic patterns in order to get a 
comprehensive understanding of the logics driving EU policy-making. The same 
research agenda was followed by Boswell, who encouraged securitization authors to 
consider alternative moves. She insisted that limiting the focus of the research to 
processes of securitization may lead to overgeneralizations as other dynamics in the 
framing of migration could potentially be obscured.50 In other words, rather than 
presupposing securitization, studies should first examine how migration issues are 
constructed in general before analyzing how these framings are affected by 9/11. The 
last part of the analysis was important in developing the final conclusions as the most 
relevant legislative acts were now read in conjunction with the JHA Council minutes, and 
were analyzed through more neutral analysis to get a better understanding of the 
different framings and the influence of 9/11 hereon.  
 
  
                                                        
47 Georgios Karyotis, "European Migration Policy in the Aftermath of September 11,” Innovation: The 
European Journal of Social Science Research 20, no. 1 (2007): 12, DOI: 10.1080/13511610701197783. 
48 Jef Huysmans and Alessandra Buonfino,"Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and 
Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK," Political Studies 56, no. 4 (2008): 781-784, DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00721.x. 
49 Stéphane J. Baele and Olivier C. Sterck, "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A 
New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims," Political Studies 63, no. 5 (2015): 1124, 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9248.12147. 
50 Christina Boswell, "Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the Absence of 
Securitization*," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 45, no. 3 (2007): 592, DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
5965.2007.00722.x. 
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4. Main findings 
 
The complexity of establishing a conclusive answer to the question of the securitization 
of migration governance is compounded by the organizational settings of the EU. Similar 
to the Member States, the EU has legislative, executive and judicial branches.51 Before 
the main results are presented, it is important to paint a picture of the institutional 
dynamics during the period 1999-2004.  
With the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, the Member States agreed to extend the 
competence of the EU to enact measures within all areas of migration and asylum law.52 
The Treaty also transformed the arrangements for decision-making. During the 
Tampere period, decisions were taken by unanimity in the Council, after consultation of 
the Parliament, and had to be initiated either by the Commission or Member States, 
which shared legislative powers.53 The European Court of Justice was provided with 
limited jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of EU 
law.54 As for executive power, Member States were in principle responsible for 
implementing the legislation. In practice, it still proved to be rather difficult to reach 
agreement on legislative proposals. One of the biggest hurdles to the adoption of 
measures in the area of migration was the fact that the Council was still acting by 
unanimity.55 This meant that no Member State had to change its national policy without 
its consent.56 Interestingly, the Commission proposed nearly every asylum and legal 
migration measure during the period under study, and Member State only exercised 
their right of initiative in the fields of external borders and irregular migration.57 The 
active use of Member States’ legislative powers in these areas gave them the power to 
                                                        
51 Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 3. 
52 Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 3-4. 
53 Satvinder S. Juss, “The Decline and decay of European refugee policy,” Oxford Journal of Legal studies 25, 
no. 2 (2005): 774-775, http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/content/25/4/749.full.pdf+html. 
54 Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 3-4. 
55 Satvinder S. Juss, “The Decline and decay of European refugee policy,” Oxford Journal of Legal studies 25, 
no. 2 (2005): 774-775, http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/content/25/4/749.full.pdf+html.  
56 Jan Niessen, Five years of EU migration and asylum policymaking under the Amsterdam and Tampere 
mandates (Brussels: Migration Policy Group, 2004), 42. 
57 Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 67.  
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control the agenda and placed the Commission in a rather peripheral position.58 The 
influence of the national agendas of the Member States on EU decision-making was 
certainly true in the case of measures related to biometrical data and the development of 
databases for migration purposes, which accelerated due to national policies in Germany 
and the Netherlands on these themes.59 In the other areas, however, the Commission, 
worked in close cooperation with the Member States. Rather than drafting their own 
proposals, the Member States expressed their preferences to the Commission, which 
was sometimes accused of moderating their national policies since proposals often 
reflected the interests of the Council.60 Finally, despite its consultation powers, the role 
of the European Parliament in policy-making proved to be much weaker in reality. In 
fact, it is hard to find any example where its views were adopted due to the 
Commission’s unwillingness and lack of political or legal obligation to redraft proposals 
following the EP’s opinion.61  
These dynamics had a cost; in June 2004, when the Commission published its final 
assessment concerning the Tampere period, it stated that despite “substantial progress 
has been made in most areas of justice and home affairs,” the EU’s institutional context 
was constrained by, among other things, the limited position of the Parliament and 
unanimity in the Council.62 The Commission acknowledged that the shared right of 
initiative sometimes precluded “the effective, rapid and transparent attainment of certain 
political commitments” as “national concerns were given priority over Tampere 
priorities.”63 All in all, Member States remained reluctant to share more sovereignty 
during the Tampere period, causing negotiations on sensitive measures to last for many 
months, sometimes even years.64  Since some of the adopted measures allowed 
                                                        
58 Evelien Brouwer, "Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic Legal and Practical 
Developments in the EU in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09," European Journal of Migration and 
Law 4, no. 4 (2002): 423, DOI: 10.1163/157181602763715000. 
59 Evelien Brouwer, "Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic Legal and Practical 
Developments in the EU in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09," European Journal of Migration and 
Law 4, no. 4 (2002): 422, DOI: 10.1163/157181602763715000. 
60 Jan Niessen, Five years of EU migration and asylum policymaking under the Amsterdam and Tampere 
mandates (Brussels: Migration Policy Group, 2004), 42. 
61 Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers, EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Text and Commentary (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 67. 
62 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme and future 
orientations,” COM(2004) 401 final, Brussels, 2 June 2004 2000 [hereinafter COM(2004) 401 final]. 
63 COM(2004) 401 final, 4. 
64 Jan Niessen, Five years of EU migration and asylum policymaking under the Amsterdam and Tampere 
mandates (Brussels: Migration Policy Group, 2004), 41.  
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considerable national discretion and had adopted the lowest common denominator as 
an EU standard, the Commission insisted that future action must go further in certain 
areas.65 
4.1 Asylum 
 
A number of prominent contributions in securitization studies have pointed to the 
securitized dynamics in the field of asylum policy following 9/11. Although some of 
these instances cannot be denied, the securitization thesis should be refined by 
acknowledging the presence of a humanitarian logic emphasizing protection, human 
rights and norms, and solidarity.66  
The Tampere conclusions, that specified how the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
needed to be implemented, underlined the EU’s commitment to freedom based on 
human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law. The Member States agreed to 
work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, “based on the full and 
inclusive application of the Geneva Convention.” To achieve this goal, the EU had drawn 
up a scoreboard to spell out a set of priorities for the years to come.67 The underlying 
reason for this commitment to a shared framework of humanitarian values was Europe’s 
inadequate response to the Kosovo refugee crisis in 1998-1999. Faced with the critique 
of a ‘fortress Europe’, the Member States wanted to embrace a new, more liberal policy 
on asylum.68 These priorities were repeated in two Communications of November 2000, 
which both reaffirmed the spirit of Tampere. 69 70 Again, the EU declared that the 
principles of the common asylum procedure must remain firmly attached to “respect for 
the Geneva Convention and other relevant human rights instruments” and supply the basis 
                                                        
65 COM(2004) 401 final, 11-12.  
66 Natalie Schmidthäussler and Arne Niemann, “The Logic of EU Policy-Making on (Irregular) Migration: 
Securitisation or Risk?,” Mainz Papers on International and European Politics, no. 6 (2014): 28, 
https://international.politics.uni-mainz.de/files/2014/07/mpiep06.pdf.  
67 Satvinder S. Juss, “The Decline and decay of European refugee policy,” Oxford Journal of Legal studies 25, 
no. 2 (2005): 776, http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/content/25/4/749.full.pdf+html. 
68 Sandra Lavenex, "The Europeanization of Refugee Policies: Normative Challenges and Institutional 
Legacies," JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 39, no. 5 (2001): 856, DOI: 10.1111/1468-5965.00334. 
69 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council: Towards a common 
asylum procedure and a uniform status, valid throughout the Union, for persons granted asylum,” 
COM(2000) 755 final, Brussels, 22 November 2000 [hereinafter COM(2000) 755 final]. 
70 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council: On a community 
immigration policy,” COM(2000) 757 final, Brussels, 22 November 2000 [hereinafter COM(2000) 757 final]. 
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for a capacity to meet “humanitarian needs on the basis of solidarity.”71 All relevant 
proposals initiated by the Commission over the next years confirmed this human rights 
approach. For example, the Council directive on minimum standards for the qualification 
of persons in need of international protection, once again, recalled that the “cornerstone 
of the system should be the full and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention.”72  
Interestingly, even in the direct aftermath of 9/11, the EU continued to follow the 
rationale set out in the Tampere Council conclusions. In reaction to the attacks an 
Extraordinary JHA Council meeting was held that issued instructions for the Commission 
“to examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding internal security and 
complying with international protection obligations and instruments”.73 The Council thus 
implied that there was potentially a link between asylum and terrorism, which echoes 
securitization studies that claim that the Member States attempted to put the Union’s 
internal security above international protection norms following 9/11.74 The JHA 
Council was followed by a Commission Communication, analyzing the legal mechanisms 
for excluding persons suspected of terrorist acts from international protection as 
refugees. Surprisingly, the Commission reinsured the EU’s commitment to its 
humanitarian tradition by stating that “refugees and asylum seekers should not become 
victims of the recent events”, from which it can be concluded that it wanted to resist the 
terrorism-asylum linkage from being made.75 The Commission continued by stating that 
it fully understood that:  
“Member States are now looking at reinforced security safeguards to prevent 
terrorists from gaining admission to their territory through different channels. 
These could include asylum channels, though in practice terrorists are not likely to 
                                                        
71COM(2000) 755 final.  
72 European Commission, “Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification 
and status of third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection,” COM(2001) 510 final, Brussels, 12 September 2001 [hereinafter COM(2001) 510 
final]. 
73 Justice and Home Affairs Council, Extraordinary Council Meeting – Justice, Home Affairs and Civil 
Protection, 20 September 2001, Council Doc. 12019/01 (Presse 327), para. 29 [hereinafter Extraordinary 
JHA Council Meeting]. 
74 Christian Kaunert, "Liberty versus Security? EU Asylum Policy and the European Commission," Journal 
of Contemporary European Research 5, no. 2 (2009): 161, 
http://www.jcer.net/index.php/jcer/article/view/172/143.  
75European Commission, “Commission Working Document: the relationship between safeguarding 
internal security and complying with international protection obligations and instruments,” COM (2001) 
743 final, Brussels, 5 December 2001 [hereinafter COM (2001) 743 final]. 
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use the asylum channel much, as other, illegal, channels are more discreet and more 
suitable for their criminal practices.”76 
The Commission placed irregular immigration higher on the list of possible means of 
entry for terrorists as opposed to asylum channels, which demonstrates that it tried to 
differentiate asylum policy from other fields. With regard to irregular migration, the 
Commission reaffirmed the terrorism-migration nexus by acknowledging that illegal 
channels were suitable for criminal practices. In addition, this excerpt also illustrates 
how securitization worked in the subfield of external borders, since the Commission 
asserted that it is completely understandable and legitimate for Member States to 
increase border security in order to prevent terrorists from entering their territory. 
These observations confirm securitization scholars that noticed a merging of the 
separated yet linked policies on border control and internal security following 9/11.77 In 
this fragment, different types of migrants are seen to be treated according to different 
logics, which corroborates the literature arguing that securitization might vary across 
subfield.78 At the same time, the analysis also illuminates how the lack of methodological 
rigor can easily lead to inaccurate verdicts of securitization. To illustrate, Brouwer 
stated that the views of the Commission expressed in the Working Documents were 
“somewhat confusing, as they seem to contradict each other.”79 Her confusion could have 
been easily solved if she had differentiated the subfields, allowing her to disentangle the 
various, indeed ‘contradicting’, discourses. Further down the document it is stated that 
security measures need to strike a proper balance with refugee protection.80 More 
specifically, the Commission endorsed the line taken by UNHCR that, rather than make 
major changes to the refugee protection regime, Member States were called on to 
“scrupulously and rigorously” apply the exclusion clauses contained in the Geneva 
Convention in order to prevent persons suspected of terrorist acts from seeking 
                                                        
76 COM (2001) 743 final, 6. 
77 See for example: Baldaccini (2008). 
78 Natalie Schmidthäussler and Arne Niemann, “The Logic of EU Policy-Making on (Irregular) Migration: 
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Developments in the EU in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09," European Journal of Migration and 
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asylum.81 The Commission thus urged the Member States to continue in the same 
tradition as they agreed to at Tampere. By stating that asylum policy should remain 
anchored within international norms, it effectively placed international law at the heart 
of EU asylum law. Another example of the European Commission’s resistance to shifting 
humanitarian norms towards securitization was the complete absence of any references 
to refugees, asylum, or the exclusion of any person seeking refugee status in the 
“Commission’s proposal for a Framework Decision on combating terrorism”.82 
At that time, public unease about migration was on the rise. Broad populist movements 
expressing their discontent about the immigration and integration of minorities had 
emerged throughout Europe and started to demand more stringent migration measures. 
These developments made it all the more surprising that the reaction of the Commission, 
in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, indicates that it made a clear effort to distinguish 
terrorism from asylum, in order to ensure a different treatment in relation to refugees. 
Furthermore, even a few years later, in 2003 for instance, when the Member States were 
faced with even more malaise in public opinion and when abuse of asylum procedures 
was perceived to be on the rise, the Commission still stressed that these developments 
constituted “a real threat to the institution of asylum and more generally for Europe’s 
humanitarian tradition”, and it underlined that such events “demand durable solutions 
and mechanisms that boost solidarity.”83    
It would be naïve to assume that these developments and the anti-terrorism agenda did 
not affect asylum policy at all. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that some of the adopted 
legislations hardly bear resemblance to their original proposals. The fact that the 
Commission proposed legislation on all aspects of asylum law before the attacks took 
place, strongly indicates that the content of the measures have been influenced by 
enhanced security concerns at the time of negotiations. Two documents are important in 
this respect. First, the “Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and 
                                                        
81 Carl Levy, "The European Union after 9/11: The Demise of a Liberal Democratic Asylum Regime?," 
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status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who 
otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted”, also 
called the definitions Directive. The second important document is titled the “Council 
Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status”, or the Directive on asylum procedures. In the aftermath of 
9/11, all Member States agreed that security concerns needed to be reflected in the 
Definitions Directive, but they became divided among two ways of doing so. After 
intense negotiations, including with the UNHCR, the JHA Council were presented with a 
proposal for their approval that added national security concerns as ground not to grant 
refugee status, which was an exclusion clause not provided for in the Geneva Convention. 
Furthermore, the proposal allowed for benefits received by refugees and persons 
enjoying subsidiary protection, such as protection from refoulement and maintaining 
family unity, to be refused, reduced or withdrawn for reasons of national security or 
public order, including in cases of terrorism. This relates back to securitization literature 
arguing that 9/11 led to a watering down of existing standards and commitments to 
international protection.84 It is worth noting that, it was not only the Member States that 
played an active role in ensuring that refugee protection would not become an avenue 
for the impunity of suspected terrorists.85 The Commission, for example, recalled that in 
cases in which it had been “prima facie” established that someone falls under the scope 
of the exclusion clauses, states should be entitled to channel such claims through an 
accelerated procedure without having the need to examine the “inclusion clauses” of the 
Refugee Convention.86 The Commission thus argued for the practice of ‘exclusion before 
inclusion’ which is contrary to the principles of international law.87 The Directive on 
asylum procedures also witnessed important amendments during the negotiation 
process. The most radical change was the introduction of the safe country of origin 
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principle, which allowed asylum seekers to be denied access to an asylum procedure 
(and the territory) altogether based on the applicant’s origin country.88 
The dynamics discussed above are what authors such as Crisp indicate as the connection 
between 9/11 and “the mounting challenge to asylum”, described as violations of 
(international) laws and norms of refugee protection in name of national security.89 It is 
interesting to note that, in this case, securitization predominantly seems to occur at the 
level of political practice instead of political discourse. This would in turn fortify 
Boswell’s argument that organizational practices may be motivated by alternative logics 
that do not correspond to the political discourse.90 Furthermore, despite acknowledging 
that these securitization instances cannot be ignored, research should be cautious about 
jumping to conclusions too soon. In the end, many authors defending the thesis that 
terrorism provided new impetus to securitize asylum, and consequently justified the 
introduction of exceptional measures, point to the example of Eurodac (a system for 
taking and comparing fingerprints of asylum seekers) to support their argument.91 This 
is quite problematic given the fact that this legislation was on the table long before 9/11. 
It illustrates that securitization was a phenomenon that clearly predated the attacks, 
which calls into question the idea that developments after September 2001 are deemed 
‘extraordinary’.92 It might as well be the case that, instead of initiating a re-orientation in 
policy practices, the terror attacks only strengthened prior existing tendencies. Lastly, 
while the literature provides extensive information on how securitization was driven by 
internal security concerns, the external dimensions of the policy agenda, aimed at 
limiting refugee flows into the EU territory, is widely neglected. The safe country of 
origin principle falls under this form of securitization, which allowed states to deny the 
examination of asylum claims and facilitated the return of asylum seekers to countries 
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through which they had passed which were considered ‘safe’.93 A second example of 
externalization is the adoption of an EU program for financial and technical assistance to 
third counties in the area of migration and asylum in 2004.94 This rule was the outcome 
of the Seville European Council in 2002, where the Member States expressed a general 
commitment to attain “closer economic cooperation, trade expansion, development 
assistance and conflict prevention … [to] reduce the underlying causes of migration 
flows”.95 These practices reveal that the EU was actively looking for ways to reduce 
migration through its foreign policy.  
4.2 Legal migration 
 
During the period 1999-2004, legal migration was the least securitized subfield. 
Attempts to keep security issues in the background are even more visible compared to 
asylum. The underlying reason for this dynamic was that there was no strong incentive 
to securitize legal migration as this conflicted with the EU’s economic interests 
regarding the internal market.  
At Tampere, the European Council underlined “the need for approximation of national 
legislations on the conditions for admission and residence of third country nationals”, and 
it stated that “the legal status of third country nationals should be approximated to that of 
Member States' nationals.” This indicates that the EU endorsed the objective of fair 
treatment of third-country nationals, guaranteeing them rights that were comparable 
with the rights and obligations of citizens in the Member States. The Council agreed to a 
more vigorous integration policy aimed at enhancing “nondiscrimination in economic, 
social and cultural life and develop measures against racism and xenophobia.” At that time, 
the EU was facing a growing problem caused by structural shortages of specific 
knowledge and skills and an ageing active workforce. Member States were therefore 
eager to consider opportunities for opening the borders for the sake of economic 
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migration. 96  This also accords with the paragraph in the Tampere conclusions 
presenting the underlying reason for spelling out these goals: 
“The European Council acknowledges the need for approximation of national 
legislations on the conditions for admission and residence of third country nationals, 
based on a shared assessment of the economic and demographic developments 
within the Union.”97 
The Tampere meeting was followed by a publication by the European Commission on a 
“Community Immigration Policy”.98 This was the first time since the signing of the 
Amsterdam Treaty that the question of a common immigration policy was discussed. At 
that time, little progress had been made on the Tampere scoreboard. In an attempt to 
revise the EU’s agenda, the Commission recognized that the “zero immigration policies of 
the past 30 years are no longer appropriate”, and it called for “new channels for legal 
immigration to the Union should now be made available for labour migrants.”99 The 
Commission highlighted that, although the first two channels of legal migration were 
asylum and family reunification, emphasis was to be placed on “the need to develop an 
immigration policy designed to admit migrants mainly for economic reasons”, as well as to 
counteract “demographic decline”.100 By stating this, the Commission recalled that it 
understood legal migration predominantly in economic terms. This becomes even more 
visible in the part where it expressed its reasons for drafting the proposal for a Council 
Directive on the right to family reunification:  
“This reflects the Commission’s view that successful integration of third country 
nationals to maintain economic and social cohesion is one of the major challenges 
which the EU faces with respect to immigration policy. The establishment of stable 
family communities ensures that migrants are able to contribute fully to their new 
societies.”101 
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Again, the Commission depicted legal migrants as economic valuable and fruitful 
contributors to European societies. However, securitization is also visible when the 
Commission indicated that migration could potentially harm the “social and economic 
cohesion of the Union”, thereby creating the image that migration posed a destabilizing 
challenge to the system.102 This kind of logic is in accordance with the literature that 
evokes the image of the EU as a gated community whose borders were selectively 
opened for migrant workers in order to bypass a growing scarcity of labor.103 In addition, 
the integration element reflects Huysmans’ idea that migrants were seen as a danger to 
the cultural identity of the EU which raised concerns over the successful integration of 
immigrants into the social fabric of the Member States. Again, these findings corroborate 
the literature refuting the connection between 9/11 and intensified securitization as it 
shows that certain securitized practices were already in place.104 
This trend continued following 9/11, albeit to a somewhat lesser degree. Similar to 
asylum, the EU tried its best to separate legal migration and terrorism. This became 
evident in the Council Conclusions adopted during the extraordinary JHA meeting which 
included lengthy paragraphs on strengthening the EU’s external border, but did not 
contain any reference to legal migration policies.105 Another pattern that both asylum 
and legal migration share is a visible change in the Member States’ willingness to adopt 
far-reaching legislative measures in the period after 9/11. To illustrate, following the 
impetus given by the Commission Communication in 2000, several draft proposals were 
tabled: on a uniform residence permit, on the status of long-term residents, on migration 
for employment or self-employment, and a proposal for an open method of co-
ordination. The latter presented an ambitious plan for deeper community integration 
based on the goal set during the Lisbon summit in March 2000 for the EU to become “the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy in the world capable of 
sustained economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”.106 
Neither the proposal on migration for employment or self-employment, nor the open 
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method of coordination became a reality during the duration of the Tampere program. 
The effect of enhanced security concerns was also reflected in the Seville European 
Council Summit in 2002, that was largely devoted to the issue of illegal migration and 
that articulated a strong mandate for enhanced border control, but remained quiet on 
the agenda of legal migration.  
Overall, these observations connect well to the argument made by Boswell, who stated 
that the securitization of legal immigration was in conflict with the policy goal of 
European governments to introduce more liberal policies on labor migration. During the 
Tampere period, governments in the UK and Germany were implementing measures to 
provide high-skilled migrants and foreign students easier access to their labor markets. 
Similar events took place in Spain concerning the regulation of illegal workers in 
response to growing labor shortages. 107  The terrorism-migration nexus proved 
therefore impossible to sustain since there was no strong incentive to do so.108 Again, 
Boswell is right in her observation and in 2003, the Commission revised its ideas via a 
new Communication that emphasized that immigration of workers offered a solution to 
skill shortages as long as appropriate migrants were attracted.109 
4.3 Irregular migration 
    
Almost all authors, who defend the correlation between 9/11 and the revival of 
securitization, point to what occurred in the fields of irregular migration and external 
border policy to justify their main thesis. As the evidence simply cannot be ignored, it is 
obvious that this accredits some of the securitization literature. The analysis also 
uncovered two alternative patterns which have remained surprisingly underexposed in 
previous studies. 
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The Amsterdam Treaty introduced a new objective:  
 
“to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in 
which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate 
measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the 
prevention and combating of crime.”110  
 
Through this wording, the EU established a direct link between the free movement of 
persons and measures intending to prevent and combat crime. This was repeated during 
the Tampere meeting where the Member States expressed the need for “a consistent 
control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organise it 
and commit related international crimes.” In doing so, the EU reaffirmed the connection 
between criminality and illegal immigration. During that same summit, the EU made a 
connection between illegal immigration and human trafficking, which was termed a 
“serious crime.”111 It was observed therefore that close co-operation with countries of 
origin and transit was necessary and the Council called for “a greater coherence of 
internal and external policies”, and “an integrated and consistent” approach to external 
relations.112 Since this policy involved a form of cooperation with third countries, it is 
part of the external dimension of migration policy, which was aimed at combating illegal 
migration through foreign policy.113  
 
The most distinctive feature in the period between Tampere and 9/11 was the French 
proposal containing four controversial measures in 2000, including the mutual 
recognition of expulsion decisions. It spelled out two possible cases of expulsion based 
on a “serious and present threat to public order or to national security and safety”, or the 
“failure to comply with national regulations on the entry or residence of aliens”.114 The 
proposal was received with fierce criticism because it lacked specific and detailed 
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human rights safeguards.115 Moreover, the Directive did not specify minimal standards 
to which the national rules of the Member States should comply when it came to how 
national expulsion decisions were taken, the grounds taken for such decisions, and the 
manner of execution.116 As the rules allowed for too much national discretion and did 
not provide adequate provisions to challenge decisions, they could possibly lead to 
unequal treatment of migrants.117 The discussions of the JHA Council revealed that 
before 9/11, the ‘externalization’ of migration control was met with considerable 
resistance since the French proposal was intensively discussed, redrafted and even 
suggested to be repealed in their entirety.118 This trend, however, was turned upside 
down following 9/11, which seemed to be a stepping stone towards the development of 
the external dimension of irregular migration policy. 
   
In 2000, when the EU faced the prospect of the largest expansion in the history of 
European integration taking place in 2004, the need for harmonized rules started to 
become more urgent because it was recognized that enlargement constituted a 
significant challenge for preventing illegal migration.119 For this reason, the next 
European Council placed irregular migration and human trafficking on top of the 
political agenda. The Member States called on the Commission to urgently bring forward 
the Tampere conclusions in this area “by adopting severe sanctions against those involved 
in this serious and despicable crime.”120 Subsequently, the Commission released a 
detailed Communication which, again, reinforced the criminal-migration nexus by 
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expressing that “criminal activities, which are regularly connected with irregular 
migration flows, are a major common concern in all Member States.”121  
 
The main findings illuminate a repeating pattern of a linkage between criminal activities 
and irregular migration. This accords well with research by Bigo, who highlighted that 
periods of endorsing the same narrative had naturalized a security discourse. 122 The 
same counts for Boswell, who showed that the development after 9/11 did not deviate 
from prior established patterns. Both concluded therefore that the events did not 
generate a new security agenda. This research, however, also points to two distinct 
trends that were to complement the existing discourse. In fact, the aforementioned 
Communication of November 2001 exhibits these supplementary patterns of 
externalization and the terrorism-migration nexus. Externalization, firstly, is reflected in 
the way that the European Commission advocated for a more extensive role for its 
external agenda by encouraging the creation of “a coherent common policy on 
readmission and return”, as one of the main lines of action to prevent and combat 
irregular migration.123 Moreover, steps were taken to develop the concept of liaison 
officers in countries of transit and origin and to co-ordinate efforts among Member 
States as the Commission believed that “permanent information exchange between 
immigration and airline liaison officers as well as with police liaison officers and other 
intelligence officers of Member States should be guaranteed.”124  
 
This was also the first document in the field of irregular migration policy in which the 
terrorism-migration nexus entered the stage as new measures were welcomed in the 
context of “prevention of terrorist threats”125 and the Commission expressed the need for 
“trustworthy action against terrorist risks.”126 Such instances of linking the issue of 
irregular migration to the danger of terrorism became much more frequent in the 
                                                        
121 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: on a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration,” COM(2001) 672 final, Brussels, 15 November 
2001, para. 3.6 [hereinafter COM(2001) 672 final].  
122 Didier Bigo, “Frontier controls in the European Union: who is in control?,” in Controlling Frontiers: Free 
Movement into and Within Europe, ed. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 63. 
123 Ryszard Cholewinski, “The EU Acquis on Irregular Migration Ten Years On: Still Reinforcing Security at 
the Expense of Rights?” In The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law, ed. Elspeth Guild and Paul 
Minderhoud (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), 183. 
124 COM(2001) 672 final, para. 4.3.1.  
125 COM(2001) 672 final, para. 4.1.4.  
126 COM(2001) 672 final, para. 5.  
Rosalie Koevoets S1739611 
 
32 
 
following years. Contrary to the opinions of Bigo and Boswell, this pattern did not 
completely adhere to existing patterns. The argument that securitization originates from 
the period preceding the terror attacks should therefore, only in this respect, be nuanced 
by accepting some new extensions to this framing. The discussion will now turn to the 
period after 9/11 to demonstrate how policy on external relations became more 
operational.127  
 
The European Council Meeting in Laeken in December 2001 reconfirmed the mandate to 
develop the external dimensions as it emphasized the need for a more structured EU 
policy on relations with third countries, including the identification of more countries 
for “conclusion of readmission agreements”, as well as the promotion of further 
cooperation “in order to combat illegal migration”.128  The Action Plan on illegal 
migration was adopted shortly after and criteria were agreed for negotiation in 
readmission agreements. 129  This plan included a paragraph titled “Pre-Frontier 
Measures”, which was devoted entirely towards steps to be taken to set up a network of 
immigration and airline liaison officers from the home ministries in order to check that 
documentation was thoroughly examined.130 The stationing of such customs agents was 
aimed at preventing would-be illegal migrants and asylum seekers from reaching the 
European borders and was therefore also coined ‘remote control’.131 In that same 
document, the Council advocated for the creation of a system for exchanging information 
on issued visas. Whereas pre-9/11 documents usually referred to the purpose of 
combatting international crime, it was now accepted that such a system could 
“contribute to the prevention of illegal immigration and to the fight against terrorism.”132 
In April 2002, the Commission advanced a Green Paper on the return of illegal residents 
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as “an integral and vital component in the fight against illegal immigration.”133 This was 
followed by a Communication on the same topic highlighting the need to “enhance 
operational co-operation among Member States in order to make return policies more 
efficient in practice.”134 The process finally resulted in the adoption of a Return Action 
Program in November 2002.135 
 
Meanwhile, as discussed under asylum policy, the EU faced an increase in the political 
sensitivity of immigration and asylum matters.136  The result was that irregular 
migration became the centerpiece of the Seville European Council in 2002 and the 2003 
Thassaloniki European Council, where Member States agreed to a strong mandate for 
control measures and return policies to curb illegal migration.137 These developments 
crystalized in numerous acts such as readmission agreements, including cooperation in 
respect of transit for the purposes of removal by air, the organization of joint flights, and 
the compensation of the financial imbalances resulting from the expulsion of third 
country nationals.138 Together with measures strengthening pre-frontier controls, and 
measures supporting countries neighboring the EU in controlling emigration or transit 
migration across their territory, these policies all presented ways through which the EU 
tried to outsource forms of migration control to non-EU countries.139 All in all, the 
evidence seems to indicate that the attacks allowed the externalization of policy action 
to be put at the heart of policy-making in the field of irregular migration. However, one 
issue which calls this causal relationship into question remains open, for it is not 
automatically proven that growing attention to the external dimension was a direct 
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effect of the attacks. Indeed, it is impossible to establish a clear-cut answer as to the 
puzzle if the policies that were introduced after 9/11 in the field of irregular migration 
resemble ‘extraordinary instruments’ that would otherwise have lacked support and 
which signaled a radical departure from the agenda of previous years. 
4.4 External borders and Visa  
 
One can rightfully argue that policy on external borders relied heavily on a security 
rationale ever since the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty. It is suggested that the politics 
of emergency surrounding 9/11 influenced this trend by shaping a political agenda 
focused on the introduction of new technological advancements and enhanced border 
security. Nevertheless, it remains important to judge these instances according to their 
intensity and place them in the wider spectrum of the discourse. 
 
At Tampere, where Member States placed an emphasis on their humanitarian tradition 
and shared commitment to more liberal legal migration policies, external border policies 
were explained in a completely different language since the Council expressed “the need 
for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to combat those 
who organize it and commit related international crimes.” The presence of such different 
discourses can be utterly confusing and easily lead to misunderstandings. Van Dijck, for 
instance, falls victim to such a misconception when she concludes that “the Tampere 
Conclusions were quite ambiguous with regard to the migration phenomenon.” She 
observed that on the one hand, Member States underlined that third country nationals 
were welcome “and that they will not be denied the freedom to access the territory”, while 
on the other hand the EU stressed the need for consistent control of external 
borders.140Again, her analysis highlights the importance of distinguishing between the 
various subfields since, rather than indicating an inconsistency on the side of the EU, 
these conclusions point to the presence of two distinct discourses driving integration in 
two separated realms of migration policy. 
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In spite of this securitized rhetoric, the Tampere conclusions did not focus much on the 
development of legislation in this area. The reason was that with the signing of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the EU agreed to incorporate the Schengen rules that already 
contained measures on visas and borders.141 Transferring the acquis into the EU 
institutional context proved to be an arduous process since not every Schengen 
provision fell neatly under the categorical division of its legal framework.142 The most 
important legislative proposals before 9/11 included the Regulation determining the list 
of third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the 
external borders. Next to carrier sanctions and liaisons officers, the visa regime was 
singled out as one of the three core strategies of pre-frontier measures to control 
immigration at distance.143 The Commission mentioned “a number of relevant sources of 
statistical information and indicators to assess the risk of illegal migratory flows,” since 
“risks relating to security and illegal immigration should be given priority consideration” 
for establishing the list.144 In other words, the EU considered ‘risks’ to be a priority 
factor against which the approval of visa applications should be reviewed. This signals 
the logic that van Munster and Neal dubbed as ‘risk management’, which supports the 
notion that EU policy-making may be more adequately described by alternative logics.145 
The significance of this regulation also lies in the fact that is arguably neglected 
international protection norms by introducing a visa requirement on refugees if the 
third country where they resided was on the list of countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the EU. In doing so, it limited 
legal ways to access the EU territory and forced refugees to make recourse to illegal 
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means of entry.146 These findings reveal that certain patterns of securitization in the 
area of visa policy were undoubtedly present before 9/11.  
 
As for visas and border controls, events took another turn after 2001 as the 
development of legislation assumed growing importance.147 This became evident by, 
firstly, the enhanced possibilities of using modern technologies for the purpose of 
gathering information on foreign nationals. Secondly, the numerous attempts to 
strengthen the EU border pointed to another trend that signals the revival of 
securitization. Discussions on the development and usage of databases gained impetus 
shortly after 9/11.148 Already on 20 September 2001, it was agreed that the Council 
would start to “examine whether to extend, in the context of counter-terrorism, SIS access 
to other public services.”149 SIS was one of the cornerstones of Schengen and constituted 
an automated international database on cross border crime used by police and border 
authorities for entry refusal purposes.150 Negotiations on updating SIS had already been 
underway since 1996 but due to its dual application as a tool for both immigration and 
criminal purposes, determining the legal basis for SIS proved to be a difficult issue.151 
With the Member States unable to reach agreement on who should take overall 
responsibility for managing the creation of a new system progress remained slow.152  
 
The process of creating SIS II accelerated after the events on 9/11, starting with the 
mandate provided by the extraordinary JHA meeting. The Austrian delegation 
subsequently presented a paper on the possible use of SIS to combat terrorism.153 
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Following discussions on this paper during the November 2001 JHA meeting, the Council 
agreed to develop the possibility of extending access to SIS beyond visa and immigration 
authorities to agencies such as Europol and Eurojust.154 In June 2002, the Council agreed 
on the new functionalities for SIS including the collection and storage of biometric 
features, the possibility of interlinking alerts, and the addition of new categories of data, 
which was legitimized by a reference to the goal of safeguarding greater effectiveness in 
combating terrorism.155       
 
The policy-making process of updating SIS I is often accredited in the securitization 
literature with the creation of ‘exceptional measures’ and ‘measures beyond law’, 
justified on the grounds of special security concerns. 156  Whereas before 9/11, 
negotiations on SIS were dominated by legal issues, in the aftermath of the attacks the 
politics of emergency shaped a policy process where there was no clear legal 
competence.157 To illustrate, in the post-9/11 climate, the democratic process was 
seriously undermined as new features and functionalities were adopted in the form of 
binding Council Conclusions that provided no possibility for consultation of the 
European or national parliaments.158 Moreover, controversial new functions such as the 
addition of biometrics and extended access to police authorities were agreed without 
considering the ethical challenge they posed to EU principles of non-discrimination, data 
protection and privacy.159 Biometric data, for instance, were more effective in linking 
information to people, which therefore allegedly transformed the original nature of SIS 
from a database used for control purposes to one used as an investigative tool.160 The 
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same can be said for extending access to SIS for Europol and Eurojust.161 In addition, at 
the November 2003 JHA Council meeting, Member States considered possibilities for 
holding the data for longer time periods and using them “for purposes other than those 
for which they were originally introduced.”162 This provision constituted a breach of the 
fundamental principles of data protection that specified that data was only to be used 
for the purpose for which they were collected.163 Regardless of this infringement, the 
Commission still decided to include this possibility in its final proposals of 2005. These 
developments are in agreement with the type of politicization that Huysmans referred to 
as ‘the politics of exception’ which produced a trade-off between security and liberty.164 
 
The intensified use of data on third-country nationals also proceeded through the 
development of the Visa Information System (VIS), a technological device to exchange 
information concerning visas, which emerged as a direct consequence of 9/11.165 At the 
extraordinary JHA meeting, the commission was invited to submit proposals “for 
establishing a network for information exchange concerning visas.” 166  This 
recommendation to “attach top priority” to “set up a common visa identification system” 
was repeated at both the Laeken and Seville European Council meetings.167 The 
overarching aim of VIS was subsequently laid down as a migration control instrument 
since it would store information on “visas issued but also data concerning visas applied 
for and refused.”168 However, as public opinion on migration deteriorated in the years 
that followed, security measures were deemed to be more necessary. In its final 
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proposal, the purpose of VIS was extended far beyond the original aim in order to cover 
more aspects including the fight against terrorism and organized crime.169 
 
These findings tend to confirm the securitization literature that claims that in the period 
after 9/11, there was a convergence of migration and security instruments.170 In 
addition, Member States exhibited a strong political will to invest in surveillance and 
information technologies which were seen as solutions against all forms of security 
problems.171 Contrary to most securitizing moves reported by this study, the use of data 
such as biometrics had never been debated before 2001. In 2003, however, this 
suddenly became one of the cornerstones of the Thessaloniki Council which urged that a 
“coherent approach is needed in the EU on biometric identifiers or biometric data, which 
would result in harmonised solutions for documents for third country nationals, EU citizens’ 
passports and information systems (VIS and SIS II).”172 Again, this seems to support the 
thesis that 9/11 had a far-reaching impact on the political practices in external borders 
and visa policy. And yet, it is important to remain cautious in accepting that the 
introduction of ‘exceptional’ policies necessarily depended on sustaining a strong link 
between terrorism and migration.173 To put it differently, it is questionable whether the 
political discourse was central to the political justification of the intensification of 
migration controls. It is beyond the scope of this research project to provide a conclusive 
answer to this last point. At the same time, it should be noted that during the initial 
phase of the research, no reliable trends in the occurrence of ‘securitization’ was 
discerned, which would support the observation that the political elite refrained from 
reviving the terrorism-migration nexus. 174 This recalls the literature that problematized 
the causal link between political discourse and securitized outcomes. Meaning that even 
if it is really the case that the discourse remained unaffected by 9/11, it might still be 
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perfectly true that securitization occurred in policy practices.175 Finally, to make things 
even more complicated, even if the last scenario in fact explains developments in this 
area, it is still open to debate if these measures are to be considered an ‘exceptional 
course of action’ since it might as well have been the case that they remained along the 
exact same lines of years before.176 
 
The argument in relation to external borders and visas is also formulated through a 
second track, namely, the numerous attempts to strengthen the EU border. The idea of 
creating a European Border Police was discussed right after 9/11. At the following 
Council meeting in Laeken in December 2001, the issue of border management was 
elevated to receive top priority as it was stated that “better management of the Union’s 
external border controls will help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration 
networks and the traffic in human beings.”177 At the Laeken Summit, the Council called for 
“conditions in which a mechanism or common services to control external borders could be 
created.” Following this recommendation, in June 2002, the Commission presented a 
Communication that repeated the need to “increase co-operation, co-ordination, 
convergence and consistency between border practitioners in EU Member States,” and 
which set out a program that would eventually lead “towards a European corps of border 
guards.”178 It is interesting to note that following 9/11, the EU immediately shifted its 
attention towards the perceived weakness of the external borders and the need to 
guarantee control over terrorists who might try to enter.179 This corresponds to 
Huysmans’ idea that politics of emergency surrounding 9/11 facilitated the integration 
of migration policy into an internal security framework, which reinforced justification 
for more stringent border controls. At the same time, based on the speed of concrete and 
operational progress, it also illuminates that this sense of urgency did not translate into 
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immediate action since it took the EU until 2004 to establish the “Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders”, also commonly known 
as FRONTEX.180 Such strikingly slow progress does not does not correspond to what is 
normally expected under the ‘politics of emergency’ and therefore, again, these 
dynamics casts doubt on the influence of 9/11. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The main findings confirm the hypothesis that the question of the impact of 9/11 on the 
securitization of migration policies at the EU level is too complex to be answered with a 
simple yes or no. Through a research that captures both the nuances of securitization 
and the general framings in each of the subfields, this dissertation demonstrates that the 
areas of asylum and legal migration policies can be differentiated from external borders 
and irregular migration due to the dominance of alternative discourses emphasizing 
humanitarian and economic aspects of migration. This leads me to the conclusion that 
the influence of 9/11 was rather limited. At the same time, part of the academic analysis 
on the effects of the terrorist attacks also focused on the growing attention to certain 
subfields at the expense of others. The slowdown of European integration with regards 
to legal migration and asylum may therefore provide an indicator that the attacks 
allowed the Member States to elevate the priority of external borders and irregular 
migration. This is further indicated by the Council’s willingness to use their shared right 
to initiate legislation in these areas. The French proposal related to the area of irregular 
migration, issued before hardly any Commission legislative proposals on asylum or legal 
migration, illustrates that the Member States used their legislative power to put certain 
issues on the agenda. This seemingly placed the Council’s emphasis on irregular 
migration and external border control from an early date. In these areas, instances of 
securitization are much more frequent and there is evidence that, following 9/11, 
Member States were willing to adopt legislation beyond the mechanisms developed in 
previous years.181 Next to securitized moves, the attacks potentially served as a catalyst 
for the EU to develop measures concerning the external dimensions of migration policy 
and to explore ways to introduce sophisticated techniques to improve border security. 
Overall, it becomes clear that there are different ingredients in EU migration policy 
which guarantees that each type of migrant is treated according to the kind of logic that 
favors the organizational interest and political mandate in that particular field.182  
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That being said, even though the analysis of legislative documents allows for the 
differentiation of the various subfields, it would be naïve to assume that asylum seekers 
or labor migrants, in reality, did not suffer from certain legislations that were now only 
discussed in the context of other areas. In addition, when the EU sought political 
justification for introducing policy practices, it could draw on a wide variety of framings. 
Meaning that even if the evidence precludes that the political discourse experienced 
more securitization, this might not hold for political practices. This is the case with 
regards to asylum policy, where the discourse was not securitized, and yet it was 
observed as being restrictive in some aspects. The main findings show that the assumed 
link between securitized discourses and securitized outcomes is indeed open to debate. 
This is further supported by the observation that in the field of external border policy, 
several technologies for surveillance and control were introduced despite the fact that 
the analysis identified no reliable change in the occurrence of securitization and hence, 
in the political discourse. The research therefore leaves us with two questions, namely, if 
9/11 was in fact central and necessary to reinforce political justification for securitized 
practices. Closely related to this is the puzzle of what exactly denotes a ‘securitized 
practice,’ for it may be perfectly true that the introduction of more stringent measures 
after 9/11 are best understood as a continuation of a trend that was well underway 
before the attacks. Further related studies should therefore remain cautious in judging 
instances of securitization since, as far as the legislation adopted after 9/11 was under 
scrutiny before the attacks, it is quite problematic to argue that such measures to 
restrict, prevent or externalize migration policy resemble ‘extraordinary instruments’ in 
order to deal with an ‘extraordinary threat’ which would have appeared controversial 
under other circumstances. After all, it seems likely that most of the EU migration 
legislation in the period following 11 September 2001 adhered to developments that 
were set in motion before and that a Pandora’s box, in reality, had been opened years 
ago. 
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